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MORAL FREE RIDING 
Garrett Cullity 
 
I:  THREE KINDS OF FREE RIDING 
 
 "Free riding" is a term of art. To settle the correctness of an account of free riding, 
we must look not to an ordinary usage but to the interests in the service of which the 
notion has been invented. There are at least three such interests, and they generate 
distinct accounts. 
 What all three may be said to have in common is a conception of the free rider as 
someone who doesn't pay for goods which she consumes, where these goods are in 
some sense public.
1
 Definitions of public goods vary widely, but they usually involve 





 if a public good is available to one member of the group 
for which it is public, then it is available to every other member at no cost to 
that other member. 
Nonexcludability:
4
 if anyone is enjoying it, no one else (in the group for which it 




 one person's consumption of the good does not 
diminish the amount available for consumption by anyone else. 
Nonrivalness:
6
 one person's enjoyment of the good does not diminish the 
benefits available to anyone else from its enjoyment.  
Compulsoriness:
7
 if anyone receives the good, no-one else can avoid doing so 
without excessive cost. 
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Equality:
8
 if anyone receives the good, everyone receives the same amount. 
Indivisibility:
9
 there can be more than one consumer of the good, and each 
consumes the total output. 
 Under many conditions, the provision of public goods will be subject to the 
following theoretical problem. The failure of a group to cooperate to produce a public 
good may be collectively, but not individually, suboptimal from the point of view of 
self-interest: that is, there can exist a failure to cooperate, without any individual's 
acting suboptimally from that point of view, even though each individual is self-
interested and is worse off without the good than he would be paying and getting it.
10
 
A first interest in free riding is the game-theoretic one of stating the conditions under 
which this "free rider problem" arises, and the terms in which it may be solved.
11
 
Notice, however, that the only kind of publicity required to produce this problem is 
jointness in supply - once the good is produced, it can be acquired without paying - 
and not publicity in any of the other respects. In particular, the problem arises equally 
for rival goods, provided they are in joint supply, like limited stocks of fish in the sea. 
Given the game-theoretic interest, then, the best definition of a free rider is this: an 
individual who, in successfully optimizing his own interests, does not contribute to 
the production of a good which is in joint supply to a certain group, in conditions 
where it would be collectively self-interestedly suboptimal for the group not to 
cooperate towards its production. 
 To what extent is the theoretical problem a practical one? This depends, clearly 
enough, on the extent to which the conditions identified by the theoretical 
investigation are actually realized, and the extent to which actual agents approximate 
optimally self-interested ones. Here lies the interest of mainstream economics in the 
free rider: in particular, it wants to know how to construct mechanisms for the 
production of public goods to which beneficiaries have an incentive to contribute.
12
 
Once we turn to tackling this practical problem, the other features of public goods 
(apart from jointness in supply) become important. In particular, the question whether 
the good is rival or not will have importance, given the effect on the motivation of 
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many people of the knowledge that others stand to be harmed by their behaviour. 
Thus for the economist's practical purposes, the best definition of a free rider is a 
different, looser one, employing a notion of publicity which ranges over the various 
features identified above: a free rider is a person who fails to pay for a public good 
she consumes, although the good is worth paying for.
13
 
 But it is a third, and distinct, interest in free riding which is the focus of attention 
in this paper. This is the distinctively moral philosophical interest in examining the 
conditions under which a certain sort of unfairness is commonly thought to arise - an 
unfairness of which the paradigm is:  
Fare-Evasion 
Public transport in my town is efficiently run on an "honour" system which 
places the onus on passengers to buy a ticket before travelling, and to cancel it 
in a machine on any vehicle which they use. I ride without paying. 
Given this interest, producing an account of free riding means specifying the 
conditions under which unfairness of this sort arises, and explaining why those 
conditions yield unfairness. Producing such an account is my aim in what follows. 
 Any account of free riding of this third sort must be distinct from the two already 
stated, for the simple reason that on either of the previous definitions, free riding 
needn't be unfair. (The usual explanation of this is that the "free ride" can be taken on 
a scheme which is itself unfair or otherwise objectionable, such as a cartel.
14
) 
Moreover, it is significant that, once more, free riding in this third sense will not 
require the presence of all of the features of publicity identified above. Someone who 
sneaks into a private theatre without paying would appear to be exhibiting the same 
sort of unfairness as the Fare-Evader, although the goods which the sneak enjoys are 
public only in the sense of being nonrival: in enjoying them, he doesn't harm anyone 
else. And there is a reason why the moral philosopher should take a special interest in 
this feature of cases of unfairness. For an important stimulus to our thinking about 
fairness is provided by the following question: "If the free rider harms no one, what is 
it about her conduct that makes it unfair?" A moral philosophical account of free 
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riding, as I shall understand it here, offers an answer to this question. The definition it 
yields will accordingly have the following schematic form: a free rider is someone 
whose failure to pay for nonrival goods under conditions C makes her conduct unfair. 
 I said that unfairness "is commonly thought to arise" in cases such as Fare-
Evasion. I don't wish to deny that there are conceptions of fairness according to which 
Fare-Evasion, sneaking into theatres and the like are not unfair, either because such 
actions harm no-one or for some other reason.
15
 The ambition of a moral 
philosophical account of free riding, as I conceive it, will not include showing that 
one must conceive of free riding as unfair - that the failure to do so shows that one is 
conceptually confused about fairness. The ambition is rather to show what, on this 
conception of fairness, counts as unfair, and why it should be thought to do so. Later, 
I shall offer an explanation of what unifies this conception, and why "unfairness" 
should be thought an appropriate term for the cases unified under it. However, an 
adjudication between this and other, rival conceptions of fairness (if it can be 
performed) is not performed here. The claim for which I shall be arguing is 
contentious enough as it stands: if Fare-Evasion is unfair, then so are some refusals to 
pay for benefits nonvoluntarily conferred upon one. 
 The two tasks to be pursued here are to specify the conditions C under which the 
failure to pay for nonrival goods is unfair, and to show how the satisfaction of the 
specified conditions contributes to making someone's conduct unfair. Now several 
writers have claimed to complete at least the first of these tasks, in advocating 
versions of what is often called the "Principle of Fairness". John Rawls first used the 
label in A Theory of Justice to refer to the following claim: 
a person is [morally] required to do his part as defined by the rules of an 
institution when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair), that 
is, it satisfies the two principles of justice; and second, one has voluntarily 
accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities 
it offers to further one's interests.
16
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The ensuing literature has been governed by an interest in whether a plausible 
refinement of this principle will provide a foundation for political obligation;
17
 and to 
this end, the central issue of contention has concerned the relaxation of Rawls's 
requirement that the benefits in question be voluntarily accepted. My own 
formulation of the Principle of Fairness, presented intuitively in Section III, endorses 
this relaxation, while differing extensionally from other such proposals. More 
significantly, it is defensible on grounds more substantial than conformity with 
"intuitive" (i.e., pretheoretical) judgements concerning imagined examples, and ad 
hominem arguments against the positive proposals of its opponents. For in Section IV, 
I address the second task mentioned above, of showing how the features contained in 
the principle contribute to making a person's conduct unfair.  
 But before redeeming these claims, let me begin with a quick look at some of the 
most prominent work on the same question. 
 
II:  VOLUNTARY AND NONVOLUNTARY BENEFITS 
 
 According to Rawls's stated Principle of Fairness,
18
 there are two features in 
virtue of which the conduct of someone like the Fare-Evader is unfair: the first 
concerns the justice of the benefit-conferring institution, and the second the voluntary 
acceptance of its benefits.  
 Now of course, Rawls's claim is only that these features are jointly sufficient for 
unfairness: he is not denying that there are other sorts of unfairness as well. However, 
A.J. Simmons was surely right to complain that his inclusion of the first, "justice 
condition" results in an unduly restricted claim. For if I have already voluntarily 
accepted the benefits offered by an institution, surely I can't then start raising 
objections about its fairness, with a view to justifying nonpayment. Even if my 
complaint is that the institution treats me unfairly by demanding a disproportionate 
share of the cost, I can't claim this, having voluntarily accepted its benefits, as a 
- 6 - 
justification for not paying altogether. Indeed, the same point would appear equally to 
militate against Simmons's own preferred version of the principle - that if one has 
voluntarily accepted the benefits conferred by a cooperative scheme, then one is 
obligated to contribute one's fair share of the costs of its production.
19
 For if I have 
voluntarily accepted the benefits, knowing the associated cost, it still seems too late to 
start cavilling about my fair share. If I had a complaint about the amount being asked 
of me, I ought not to have taken the benefits in the first place. 
 However, the more important and controversial question concerns Rawls's second 
condition, according to which one must have "voluntarily accepted the benefits of the 
arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one's 
interests." It is not clear exactly how Rawls intends this to be construed: how 
inclusive a reading should be given to the latter clause? In common with others,
20
 I 
shall maintain that unless it is given an extremely inclusive reading, this condition is 
also too restrictive. We should endorse what I shall call an extended Principle of 
Fairness - one according to which it can be unfair to refuse to contribute to the 
production of benefits which have been conferred upon one nonvoluntarily. However, 
anyone advocating such a view confronts the vigorous and influential opposition to 
such a relaxation expressed by Robert Nozick in a few pages of Anarchy, State and 
Utopia. As Nozick's lively examples suggest, surely there is something morally 
objectionable about the idea that you might be able to obligate others to pay you by 
pressing benefits on them against their will: this would appear to ground an 
accusation of unfairness against the benefactors rather than the beneficiary. An 
example of my own gives the type to which Nozick's belong: 
The Enterprising Elves 
On the first day in my newly carpeted house, I leave my shoes outside. In the 
morning I am delighted to find they have been extraordinarily well repaired. I 
am less delighted when I receive the bill.
21
 
Here, it seems that all I need to say to support the fairness of refusing to pay is that the 
benefits were forced on me. To this basic point Nozick adds a number of subsidiary 
- 7 - 
ones against possible schemes for conferring nonvoluntary benefits: if the benefits are 
not worth the demanded cost,
22
 or they are not fairly distributed,
23
 or my 
conscientious objection to the scheme is justified,
24
 then this only adds to the case for 
the fairness of refusing to pay. However, the main point would seem to be 
independent of these further ones. In the case just imagined, my refusing to pay would 
be fair, even if the benefit-conferring institution possesses none of these defects - the 
work is worth the money, costs and benefits are distributed fairly, and there are no 
grounds for conscientiously refusing to support this institution in favour of an 
alternative: it is enough, it seems, that the benefits were unsolicited.  
 This judgement may seem persuasive, but so also, to several writers, does the 
judgement that the refusal to pay is not fair in a case such as the following: 
The Recalcitrant Fisherman 
Pollution from the boats fishing our lake has become serious enough to affect 
the catch. Every fisherman agrees to stop polluting the lake, and contribute 
towards cleaning it up - except one, who protests, "I have not chosen to receive 
these benefits, nor have I  misled you into  conferring  them on me.  I am simply 




If the community is large enough, perhaps his practices are not detrimental to other 
people (his pollution alone may not affect the fish). And if we suppose that the others' 
actions enhance the health of the fish, but not their number, then it is hard to see how 
he accepts, in any substantial sense, the benefits conferred upon him.
26
 I submit that 
he is still being unfair. 
 The example, of course, is bound to be controversial. However, a line of objection 
which should not be maintained against it is that since nonpayment for unsolicited 
benefits is fair in the earlier, Nozickian example of the Enterprising Elves, it must be 
equally fair here.
27
 For not all cases of nonpayment for unsolicited benefits are the 
same. If we follow Richard Arneson, the key to reconciling the Nozickian resistance 
to paying in the former sort of case with a complaint of unfairness against 
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nonpayment in the latter, is to observe that the former case deals in excludable goods, 
while in the latter the goods are nonexcludable.
28
 However, it is not as if it is open 
simply to claim that, if I receive nonexcludable benefits from a scheme of any kind, it 
is unfair to refuse to meet its requirements of payment. The six further conditions 
which Arneson thinks must be added are assembled by him into the following version 
of the Principle of Fairness:  
where a scheme of cooperation is established that supplies a collective [i.e., 
nonexcludable] benefit that is worth its cost to each recipient, where the burdens 
of cooperation are fairly divided, where it is unfeasible to attract voluntary 
compliance to the scheme via supplementary private benefits,
29
 and where the 
collective benefit is either voluntarily accepted or such that voluntary acceptance 
of it is impossible, those who contribute their assigned fair share of the costs of 
the scheme have a right, against the remaining beneficiaries, that they should 
also pay their fair share. (p.623) 
 It seems to me that there remain problems with the extension of this proposal, and 
likewise for those more recent proposals made in the same spirit. But on this score, let 
me simply note that, since the benefits received in the original Fare-Evasion example 
are excludable, its unfairness is not entailed by Arneson's principle - so his principle 




 A more fundamental point is this: how can a proposal like this one claim to supply 
a full answer to the question with which I began? That is, given the conditions under 
which it claims a person's conduct to be unfair, how does the satisfaction of those 
conditions contribute to making it unfair? The force of this question is independent of 
any concerns one may have about the extension of the principle. For even if one were 
disposed to accept all the judgements falling under it, one is still entitled to question 
whether it is the satisfaction of its conditions which makes a person's conduct unfair. 
Of course, it is not as if this sort of question will always be intelligible. To ask how its 
expressing a delight in the suffering of others contributes to making an action cruel, 
for instance, is to invite the response that one can't have grasped the concept of 
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cruelty. However, the connection between unfairness and the various conditions of the 
principle just stated can hardly be claimed to exhibit this degree of transparency. 
 Moreover, the force of the question is surely intensified by the existence of 
determined opposition to the extension of the Principle of Fairness to cover 
nonvoluntary benefits. A thoroughgoing opponent will simply fail to find any 
plausibility in intuitive judgements such as the one advanced above about the 
Recalcitrant Fisherman.  
 Now it is not obvious what, if anything, there is to be said against this sort of 
opponent. Certainly, other proponents of extended versions of the principle are not 
sensibly thought of as seeking to address him.
31
 They clearly start from premises by 
which he needn't be impressed, and it is not obvious that we are entitled to expect any 
better. But we can in fact do better - or so I shall argue. After expounding my own 
reformulation of the principle, I shall offer an argument in its support which takes on 
directly the sort of thoroughgoing opponent just described, against whom attempts at 
intuitive illustrations of its plausibility make no headway. From premises which even 
he should accept, an extended Principle of Fairness can be derived. 
 
III:  A PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS 
 
 The problem faced by anyone who would defend an extended Principle of 
Fairness (according to which refusing to meet demands to pay for nonvoluntary 
benefits can be unfair) is that of discriminating circumstances where such demands 
are reasonable from those where they are merely predatory. We have seen Arneson's 
proposal for doing so. But now consider this simpler suggestion, which is a prototype 
of the principle to be advocated here. 
If a person is benefited by a scheme
32
 which makes fairly distributed 
requirements, the benefit is worth its cost, and it is not the case that practically 
everyone would be made worse off by the practice of regarding as obligatory
33
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those further requirements which must in fairness be regarded as obligatory if 
the requirements in question are regarded as obligatory, she is being unfair. 
 To see how this precludes the predatory demands, recall the earlier example. 
Having had my shoes repaired, I have benefited from the Enterprising Elves' shoe-
repairing scheme; and since they do not overcharge for their services, the 
requirements of their scheme are fairly distributed and the benefits worth their cost. 
However, consider what would be entailed if we were to recognize as obligatory all 
the further demands which would in fairness have to be so regarded if the demands of 
the Enterprising Elves were regarded as obligatory. (I shall call this fairly 
generalizing the demands made by the Enterprising Elves.) It would mean holding 
everyone liable to pay for all unsolicited benefits which are worth their cost. A 
commercial system which recognized this sort of liability would be so cripplingly 
inefficient that it would impoverish us:  it is clearly better for practically everyone if 
commercial transactions can only be entered into by means of an explicit act of 
commitment. By requiring, therefore, that the fair generalization of the scheme's 
requirements must not make practically everyone worse off, my principle 
accommodates the right conclusion, that my not paying my benefactors in this case is 
fair. In contrast, the fair generalization of the requirement imposed by the clean 
fishing scheme which benefits the Recalcitrant Fisherman is the making of a fairly 
assessed sacrifice by each in order to preserve the livelihood of all. This would be 
beneficial to each person of whom the requirements are made, and detrimental to no-
one else. 
 A word on "practically everyone". It would be too strong to require that no-one is 
to be made worse off by the fair generalization of the scheme's requirements: there 
might be a few resourceful types (perhaps the Elves themselves) who would stand to 
benefit in the chaos resulting from the shoe-repairing scheme's fair generalization, but 
this surely doesn't militate against the fairness of my nonpayment. In accommodating 
this point, though, by requiring only that practically everyone is not to be made worse 
off by the scheme's fair generalization, I may have raised a different worry. I might 
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seem to be implying that it is always fair to promote benefits to the overwhelming 
majority at the expense of a minority, which looks false. This worry is met by 
stipulating: "practically everyone" means either everyone, or enough others, and in 
such circumstances, as to make it unreasonable for the minority to resist the outcome 
which is better for the majority.
34
 
 Now most previous formulations of the Principle of Fairness can disqualify 
demands of the sort exemplified by the Enterprising Elves on at least one of two 
grounds: the benefits in question are excludable, and the scheme which confers them 
is not cooperative.
35
 However, the version of the principle just stated includes neither 
of these conditions. That this is a point in its favour is suggested by:  
The Shoe-Repairing Convention 
I move into an area where there is a well-established convention (of which I am 
unaware) that leaving one's shoes outside amounts to a request to have them 
fixed. But when mine are repaired, I refuse to pay.  
This scheme is not cooperative (except in the sense in which the maintenance of any 
convention is), and it confers excludable benefits. But this time, my refusal would be 
unfair: in particular, my complaint that the cleaning of my own shoes was unsolicited 
would appear to be beside the point. For unless there is a reason for holding that the 
shoe-repairers' practice itself violates a commercial code of overriding validity,
36
 the 
fact that there is a fair (if unusual) convention governing commercial transactions in 
the community I have chosen to join vitiates my complaint. Notice, moreover, that it 
doesn't seem to matter whether I knew of their practice before moving or not. If 
someone brought up in a culture where it is acceptable to taste food before 
committing oneself to a purchase does so on his first visit to a British grocer's, there 
may be no question of blaming him for doing so, but the shopkeeper is entitled to 
demand payment all the same. 
 The unfairness of my refusing to meet the demands of the Shoe-Repairing 
Convention is entailed by the principle stated above. For here, unlike the case of the 
Enterprising Elves, people can choose which benefits to receive, by choosing whether 
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to leave their shoes out or not. No chaotic perils lie in the adoption of their alternative 
commercial convention, so the fair generalization of the scheme remains acceptable. 
And the unfairness of the Fare-Evader and the theatre sneak with whom I began are 
similarly accommodated. 
 I promised a defence of my principle which goes beyond this sort of appeal to 
consonance with intuitive judgements. Before providing it, however, the principle 
requires some modification.  
 In particular, let us examine the clause requiring that the benefit received must be 
worth its cost. The need for greater precision here is most clearly displayed in the case 
of benefits which are luxuries. Suppose I am compulsorily benefited by a new scheme 
for cleaning and maintaining the pavements to an exceptionally high standard; and 
that the work is very efficiently carried out, so that the bill for my contribution, 
although substantial, is not exorbitant; but that I'm quite poor and don't particularly 
care whether the pavements are immaculate rather than merely tolerable. Is the benefit 
worth the cost? There is clearly a sense in which it is - I'm not being overcharged for 
the service - but surely more relevant is the sense in which it is not: all things 
considered, I'd be worse off getting the benefit and paying than if I did neither.  
 However, this latter suggestion requires amplification in three further respects. 
First, not every benefit conferred by a scheme is relevant to drawing conclusions 
about the unfairness of nonpayment. If a piece of treasure turns up in the belly of one 
of the newly energetic fish caught by the Recalcitrant Fisherman, this consequence of 
others' participation in the fishing scheme is surely irrelevant to any complaint of 
unfairness against him. Why do we regard this kind of benefit as extraneous? 
Evidently, because of the description under which the scheme's benefits are produced. 
The aim towards which the fishermen are cooperating is not the discovery of treasure 
but the protection of their livelihoods, so only the latter benefits are relevant to an 
accusation of unfairness.  
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 A similar question arises in relation to the costs imposed by a scheme. Which of 
these, in addition to those explicitly designated as payments for the scheme's benefits, 
bear on the fairness of nonparticipation? Some evidently do: if the Recalcitrant 
Fisherman can observe that the process of rendering the lake safe for fish has made 
the water unsafe for his family to swim in and drink, surely this lends support to his 
complaint that the demand on him for payment is unreasonable. But some costs are 
clearly irrelevant: if the Fare-Evader is eventually run over by a bus, this doesn't show 
that her fare-evasion was justifiable after all. What explains the difference? The 
general form of the explanation seems to be this. A cost which an individual suffers as 
a consequence of others' participation in a benefit-conferring scheme bears on the 
fairness of his nonparticipation when the others, in participating, are collectively 
morally answerable for those costs - where this means that they ought, morally, either 




 The third complication is this. When determining the sense in which one must 
receive a net benefit from a scheme (for noncompliers are to be appropriately accused 
of unfairness), we need to exclude  from consideration any benefits which result from 
the scheme, but which depend on others' nonparticipation. This point applies to 
contexts where there is partial compliance with a heavily demanding scheme. 
Suppose the fish in our example are being poisoned by a substance all the fishermen 
are using, and that when several refrain from using it, the fish return to perfect health. 
But suppose also that without the regular introduction of moderate quantities of this 
substance into the lake, the fish would all have died. Now consider the proposal that I 
refrain from using the substance altogether. I have benefited as a result of others' 
participation in this scheme, and perhaps the cost of compliance does not outweigh 
that benefit. But if the scheme requires me not simply to moderate the amount of the 
substance I use but to refrain from using it altogether, then the following point is 
significant: the scheme only produces its benefit by relying on others' noncompliance 
with this requirement. (Without the noncompliance all the fish would be dead.) So 
- 14 - 
against the demand that I comply with this scheme's requirement, there seems to be an 
effective reply: I'm actually benefited more by the noncompliers than by the 
compliers. And if so, then the accusation that I am unfairly free riding on the latter is 
surely undermined. 
 The foregoing remarks suggest the following interpretation of the requirement that 
the benefit received by a free rider must be worth its cost. It must be the case that the 
balance of the benefits and costs attributable (in the specified sense) to others' 
participation in the scheme, plus the cost of my own compliance with the scheme's 
requirements, but excluding from consideration any benefits attributable (in that 
sense) to others' nonparticipation, is positive. Let us call this the requirement that the 
practice of participation in the scheme is to represent a net benefit for me.  
 The final version of my Principle of Fairness can now be stated. 
If a person receives benefits from a scheme which satisfies the following 
conditions, it is unfair for her not to meet the requirements it makes of her in 
respect of her enjoyment of those benefits. 
(i) The practice of participation in the scheme represents a net benefit for 
her. 
(ii) It is not the case that practically everyone would be made worse off by 
the practice of participation in the recognition as obligatory of those further 
requirements which must in fairness be regarded as obligatory if the 
requirements in question are regarded as obligatory.  
(iii) She is not raising a legitimate moral objection to the scheme. 
 Condition (i) elaborates on the earlier formulation of the principle in the manner 
just explained - replacing its clause requiring that the benefits in question be worth 
their cost with the requirement that the practice of participation in the scheme 
represent a net benefit. Condition (ii) qualifies, in the same way, the clause requiring 
that the "fair generalization" of the scheme's requirements not be to practically 
everyone's detriment. And condition (iii) reintroduces Rawls's requirement that the 
benefit-conferring scheme be a just one, modifying it in two respects. First, it 
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concerns moral objections to a scheme beyond those of injustice: the objection might 
be not that there is anything unjust about the scheme, but that it is cruel, wasteful, or 
degrading.
38
 But secondly, it requires that the act of noncompliance must itself be the 
raising of a legitimate moral objection in order to be fair. For it seems intuitively that 
gangsters can free-ride on their extortion rackets, too: their unfairness to their 
associates is not dissolved by the moral objections to the schemes themselves. 
 Now it might seem that, despite these modifications, the third condition faces the 
problem Simmons raised for Rawls's justice condition. My principle purports to apply 
both to schemes which confer benefits nonvoluntarily and to those which make 
benefits available for voluntary acceptance. But in the latter case, surely Simmons is 
right to claim that my acceptance of the benefits vitiates any attempt to justify 
nonpayment by complaining that the institution is morally objectionable. Suppose I 
join a time-sharing holiday scheme: I can't take my holiday and then refuse to pay for 
it on the grounds that other members of the scheme are being overcharged. And if the 
principle cannot accommodate this judgement, then that seems to be a serious defect - 
for the unfairness here seems to be of the same paradigmatic sort exhibited by the 
Fare-Evader, which the principle set out to capture. 
 But is such a judgement incompatible with my principle? Let us examine it more 
closely. If we judge nonpayment in such a case to be objectionable, it is because we 
endorse the convention that accepting benefits at an accessibly advertised price binds 
one to pay that price. But having noted the existence of this convention, the elasticity 
of the notion of a "scheme" employed by the principle becomes significant. For the 
convention just described clearly qualifies as a benefit-conferring scheme in my 
sense. Given the existence of first-order benefits such as holidays, we can consider the 
following second-order benefit: the opportunity to enjoy such first-order benefits if 
one wishes. In respect of this benefit, a requirement is conventionally made - the 
requirement that one restrict oneself in the following conditional way: if one accepts 
first-order benefits which are made available at an accessibly advertised price, one is 
bound to pay that price. 
- 16 - 
 Not only does this convention qualify as a scheme in my sense; it also satisfies the 
principle's three conditions. The practice of participation in this scheme represents a 
net benefit, since the benefit conferred by others' participation (the opportunity to 
acquire first-order goods) is worth its cost (being restricted to acquiring them only if 
one pays). Its fair generalization is not to practically everyone's detriment. And there 
appears to be nothing morally objectionable about the convention: the fact that its 
benefits and requirements are conferred equally upon everyone seems to make it free 
of distributive unfairness, and there appears to be no other moral flaw. If so, the 
unfairness of refusing to pay for the voluntarily accepted benefits of an immoral 
scheme can be explained as the unfairness of noncompliance with this second-order 
scheme. Simmons's point, it transpires, is a corollary of my principle.
39
  
 Notice that the proposed principle really is a principle of fairness. It is concerned 
to specify the conditions under which nonpayment is unfair, rather than to say 
anything about any rights or entitlements which the producers of a benefit may have. 
In this, it differs from previous proposals; and more particularly, it does not as it 
stands claim to set out conditions for the legitimacy of coercing beneficiaries to 
contribute to a benefit-conferring scheme. 
 This modesty admittedly reduces the principle's interest, since it evidently 
precludes drawing the sorts of conclusions concerning political obligation which 
others have sought from a Principle of Fairness. However, in reaching for these 
conclusions, the other accounts commit themselves to unacceptably strong claims. My 
own claim concerning the Recalcitrant Fisherman has been that his noncompliance is 
unfair; according to the previous attempts, the compliers can force him to pay. What 
is wrong with the stronger claim? It is that if there's any question of the use of force, it 
should be applied by the police, rather than those making the complaint. Why? For 
the reason captured in condition (ii) above. If we accepted the entitlement of the 
fishermen here to enforce their own complaints of unfairness, we must in fairness 
extend a similar entitlement to everyone else. However, this would be worse for 
practically everyone than ceding such powers of enforcement to the police. And this 
- 17 - 
gives the objection its final twist. In enforcing their own complaints of unfairness, the 
fishermen would be arrogating privileges to themselves while relying (for the benefits 
conferred upon them by the rule of law) upon the renunciation of those privileges by 
others. Their complaint of unfairness would rebound upon them.  
 But if this is right, it suggests that a less reticent, but closely related, principle 
governs the case where a benefit-conferring scheme is coercive: 
If a person receives benefits from a coercive scheme which satisfies conditions 
(i)-(iii), but does not meet the requirements it makes of her in respect of her 
enjoyment of those benefits, the scheme's prescribed methods of coercion may 
fairly be used to compel her to meet them. 
If they were seeking themselves to employ coercion, then the fishermen's scheme 
would fail to satisfy condition (ii), since its fair generalization would be detrimental to 
practically everyone.
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 However, the unfairness of failing to contribute to their 
noncoercive scheme will be endorsed by the primary version of the principle. 
 The principle governing coercive schemes gives us a plausible ingredient in an 
argument for political obligation. However, it cannot be part of the ambition of the 
present paper to complete such an argument. For by far the larger part of that task 
would be the defence of the claim, for any given scheme of political coercion, that the 
practice of participation in it does indeed represent a net benefit for a putatively 
obligated citizen. Since this would mean showing that the scheme's constraints on 
personal autonomy are outweighed by the benefits it produces, it is hard to see how 
such a claim could be defended without first producing an account of the value of 
autonomy. 
 A moral philosophical account of free riding, I observed at the outset, is one 
governed by an interest in answering, in cases like Fare-Evasion, the question, "If the 
free rider harms no one, what is it about her conduct that makes it unfair?" A moral 
philosophical definition of the free rider, I remarked, would therefore have the 
schematic form: a free rider is someone whose failure to pay for nonrival goods under 
conditions C makes her conduct unfair. The version of the Principle of Fairness which 
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has now been expounded and given intuitive support specifies those conditions. This 
completes my first task. But there remains a second: to explain how the satisfaction of 
the specified conditions contributes to making nonpayment unfair. And I have 
undertaken to offer that explanation to an opponent who fails to find any intuitive 
plausibility in an extended Principle of Fairness. 
 
IV:  JUSTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 Nothing short of a fully-fledged theory of justice would count as completely 
fulfilling this second task. However, it is possible to make progress here without 
anything so ambitious. My argument starts simply by assuming the unfairness of Fare-
Evasion - not that this judgement deserves any especially privileged status; but it does 
appear to be a reasonable starting-point, and gains support to the extent that the 
following discussion can integrate it into a recognizable conception of fairness. 
Anyone who accepts this, I shall now argue, should accept the extended Principle of 
Fairness formulated above. 
 The Fare-Evader shows us something important about fairness - that particular 
acts of unfairness needn't harm anyone. If not, where does the unfairness in her 
conduct lie? An answer of the most general and uncontentious kind is this: the Fare-
Evader's unfairness is a matter of her giving herself objectionably preferential 
treatment. In seeking the benefits she does, the Fare-Evader depends upon the 
willingness of others to subject themselves to a requirement to pay, without being 
willing to do so herself. The benefits only exist because others who seek them take it 
upon themselves to contribute towards their production: in taking them, she arrogates 
to herself a privilege - the free enjoyment of those benefits - while depending on the 
renunciation of that privilege by the others.  
 Now these remarks, I readily accept, are not in themselves especially illuminating. 
The claim is not that in all unfair actions, the agent preferentially favours herself;
41
 
- 19 - 
but rather that in this case, the unfairness consists in objectionably preferential 
treatment. And there is obviously no question of entertaining any analytic ambitions 
for the latter phrase - the sense in which the preferential treatment is objectionable is 
that it is unfair. So far, then, my thoroughgoing opponent, who finds nothing unfair in 
the refusal to pay for nonvoluntary benefits, has been given no reason to disagree. The 
contentious issue is this: In just what feature of the Fare-Evader's conduct does her 
objectionably preferential treatment of herself lie? 
 One feature of obvious relevance is her dependence for the benefits she receives 
on others' willingness to pay, without being willing to do so herself. Once more, there 
is no need for my opponent to deny this. What he must deny, though, is that this 
feature is by itself sufficient to make a person's treatment of herself objectionably 
preferential. For such a dependence is exhibited by agents (such as the Recalcitrant 
Fisherman) who refuse to pay for nonvoluntary benefits, as well as by those who 
refuse to pay for benefits they have sought out. However, there is surely a sense in 
which any case exhibiting a dependence of this sort is one where the agent gives 
herself preferential treatment: she makes a special case of herself, allowing herself not 
to pay for goods which she either does or ought to realize are worth paying for, and 
which she only receives because others are moved by the same realization to pay. The 
issue between me and my opponent is whether preferential treatment in this sense is 
objectionable. As far as I can see, making a special case of oneself in this way does 
intuitively amount to unfairness. But my thoroughgoing opponent disagrees. For him, 
we have only identified a sense in which the Fare-Evader's treatment of herself is 
objectionably preferential when we have invoked the fact that she deliberately takes 
the benefits for the existence of which she depends upon others' willingness to pay. 
 The question I wish to press against the thoroughgoing opponent is this. How does 
one's deliberately taking, rather than merely receiving, a benefit contribute to making 
one's treatment of oneself objectionably preferential? I shall consider the various 
answers open to him, and argue that none is satisfactroy. 
- 20 - 
 The quickest sort of answer will be that taking the benefits involves theft, or the 
violation of rights. But neither of these suggestions will get us very far, even 
supposing a close connection between them and considerations of unfairness. Clearly, 
the unauthorized taking of benefits is not always morally objectionable: consider a 
bird-watcher who refuses to buy from a fruit-grower outside whose orchard he has 
come to camp. We need to supply the grounds for regarding the taking of benefits by 
the Fare-Evader as objectionable, and thus a candidate to be described as theft or the 
violation of rights, but other cases of the unauthorized taking of benefits as 
unobjectionable. These are not moral premises, but moral conclusions. 
 A more promising attempt to show how the Fare-Evader's taking the benefit 
contributes to her unfairness appeals to differences between the content of the 
intention of the taker of a benefit and that of a receiver. That there are such 
differences is undeniable: the Fare-Evader intends to take the benefit, whereas the 
Recalcitrant Fisherman does not - it is forced upon him against his will. And this is to 
say that the Fare-Evader allows her practical plans to be governed by the actions of 
compliers in a way that the Recalcitrant Fisherman's are not. Had the other commuters 
acted differently, and the bus-riding benefits been unavailable, the Fare-Evader would 
have had to modify her actions; had the other fishermen acted differently, not 
conferring the benefits on the Recalcitrant Fisherman, he sincerely tells us that he 
would simply have carried on as before.
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 So while there may be a sense (the one 
mentioned above) in which both of them depend for the receipt of benefits on others' 
compliance, there is also a sense in which only the Fare-Evader relies on it. And this 
provides a sense in which the Fare-Evader takes advantage of, and exploits, the 
others' benefit-producing compliance, but the Recalcitrant Fisherman does not.
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 There may be such a sense, but it is not yet one in which taking advantage of and 
exploiting other people is unfair. For it applies equally to the actions of any fare-
payer. Paying commuters share the Fare-Evader's intention of securing the benefits of 
the public transport scheme - their plans are accordingly governed by the actions of 
other compliers, in the same way - and yet they do not act unfairly. Now this remark 
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may seem to be merely beside the point: no-one is saying that the taking of benefits 
contributes to making an action unfair, irrespective of whether the benefits are paid 
for. What it shows, however, is that if there is a morally significant sense in which the 
Fare-Evader takes advantage of, or exploits, the others' compliance, it is not provided 
simply by her intending to take the benefits it produces. To secure a morally 
significant sense in which she does so, my opponent clearly must invoke not only the 
intention to secure the benefits, but non-payment as well. 
 But how can he do so? It won't help to describe the Fare-Evader's intention more 
carefully as one of taking the benefit without paying. This suggestion avoids the 
previous problem - the sense in which someone with this intention exploits the 
compliers who produce the benefit does now seem morally significant. Its problem, 
though, is the converse: this intention is one the Fare-Evader needn't possess. Perhaps 
she has got onto the bus intending to pay, because she expects to be asked to do so by 
a conductor; when none appears, and once she is already receiving the benefit, she 
decides to see whether she can get away without paying. Here, the Fare-Evasion is not 
premeditated, but it surely exhibits the same sort of unfairness as the premeditated 
variety. At no time does the unpremeditated Fare-Evader intend to take the benefits 
without paying: when she first forms the intention of not paying, they have already 
been taken.   
 Thus it is difficult to see how appealing to the content of the Fare-Evader's 
intention helps to advance my opponent's case, according to which her taking the 
benefits is essential to the unfairness of her conduct. Either he underspecifies the 
content of that intention - simply as taking the benefits - with the result that fare-
payers share it, or he overspecifies its content - as taking the benefits without paying - 
so that not all Fare-Evaders possess it. Of course, there is an intention which all Fare-
Evaders share, and which I am happy to allow yields a morally significant sense of 
exploitation: the de re intention not to pay for benefits which have only been 
produced through others' willingness to do so. But this intention is displayed equally 
in the Recalcitrant Fisherman's refusal to pay for the benefits nonvoluntarily conferred 
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upon him. In this sense, he too exploits, or takes advantage of, the willingness of 
others to pay for the benefits he receives - he deliberately refuses to pay for them - 
and this, I am maintaining, is the morally significant sense.  
 When I say this, I am not denying that the Fare-Evader's intentions are different 
from those of both fare-payers and Recalcitrant Fishermen. The difference can easily 
be stated: she possesses, at the same or different times, both the intention to take the 
benefits, and the intention to refrain from paying. What I have been arguing, though, 
is that it is hard to see how the first intention makes a further contribution towards her 
unfairness, when it is added to her unwillingness to pay for benefits for the receipt of 
which she depends on others' willingness to pay. 
 But perhaps there is a more attractive line for my opponent to take. Perhaps it is 
not their intentions concerning their own actions which secure him the morally 
significant difference between the Fare-Evader and the Recalcitrant Fisherman, but 
their preferences concerning others'. The Recalcitrant Fisherman, as initially 
described, was prepared to extend the privilege of nonpayment to everyone else. He 
would actually prefer it if no one contributed; and therefore (it might be maintained) 
does not arrogate any privileges peculiarly to himself.  
 The difficulty now, however, is to see what prevents the Fare-Evader from 
possessing a similar willingness to extend her privilege of nonpayment to other bus-
users. It might appear that since her conduct plainly exhibits a preference for 
acquiring the benefit, the profession of such a willingness could not be sincere. But 
what stands in the way of sincerity here? Can she not prefer it even more if everyone 
shared her disposition not to pay, and there was consequently no benefit to be had? 
Not if she's rational, to be sure, for this would leave everyone, including her, worse 
off. It does appear that rational preferences about the conduct of others, consistent 
with the Fare-Evader's own conduct, would commit her to an arrogation of privileges 
of nonpayment to herself. But once more, it won't help the opponent to cite this 
feature of the case of Fare-Evasion as contributing towards its morally objectionable 
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nature. For again, it is exemplified by the Recalcitrant Fisherman. His preference, 
sincere though it may be, is irrational, given the fundamental benefit conferred on him 
by the preservation of his livelihood. It is tempting to protest that although the 
Fisherman is given preferential treatment by the others, he can't be accused of giving 
himself preferential treatment, since he doesn't give himself anything. But the 
response should be clear. It is not by taking the benefits that he is giving himself 
preferential treatment, but by refusing to pay for them. 
 It is true, of course, that as initially described, the Fare-Evader resorts to deception 
and the Recalcitrant Fisherman doesn't: it is essential to the success of her plan that 
she doesn't announce her intention of nonpayment in the way that he does. And this is 
surely one morally objectionable feature of her conduct. But it is not the one my 
opponent is after; for a more brazen Fare-Evader who makes no secret of her intention 
to free-ride on the others still exhibits the unfairness he is seeking to explain. 
 So it is hard to see how the deliberate taking of benefits helps to characterize the 
Fare-Evader's objectionably preferential treatment of herself, in which the unfairness 
of her conduct consists. And if, in such paradigmatic cases of free riding, even the 
taking of benefits does not contribute to characterizing their unfairness, then it is hard 
to see how the voluntary acceptance of benefits can ever do so. The feature of primary 
moral significance, it seems, is simply the Fare-Evader's dependence for the benefits 
she receives on others' willingness to pay for them, without being willing to do so 
herself. This can be displayed equally in the refusal to pay for nonvoluntary benefits. 
In the absence of any explanation of why this feature should not support the 




 Don't misconstrue the method of argument I have been using to this end. My 
question has been, What is it about the taking of benefits that helps it to contribute to 
the unfairness of Fare-Evasion? I have been considering in turn the features of it 
which might be cited in reply, and showing that in each case, the feature is also 
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present in cases where either there is no unfairness or benefits are conferred 
nonvoluntarily. But I am not arguing that if in one case possessing a certain feature, 
there is no unfairness, then that feature cannot contribute to the unfairness of Fare-
Evasion. (This would be fallacious, relying on the false assumption that if feature A 
of a first situation and feature B of a second are without moral significance then they 
cannot be morally significant in conjunction with each other.)
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 Rather, I am arguing 
that if so, then the feature is not sufficient on its own for unfairness, and hence that its 
purported contribution to unfairness is not obvious. We require a further explanation 
of how the feature's combining with others does contribute to unfairness; but the 
further explanations have been found wanting, in the same way. 
 The Principle of Fairness ought, therefore, to be endorsed in a version in which it 
is extended to encompass nonvoluntary benefits. But why (finally) in the detailed way 
advocated in Section III above? The foregoing characterization of the free rider's 
unfairness equips me with the only materials I need to answer this. The core of the 
principle is the claim I have just been discussing: if a person receives a net benefit 
from a scheme, then her unpreparedness to meet its requirements, when she depends 
for the benefits she receives on others' meeting them, is unfair. The main elaborations 
on this core are the introduction of the notion that it is the practice of participation in 
the scheme which is to represent a net benefit for her, and the addition of two further 
conditions. The support for these elaborations can now be stated, by recalling the 
earlier discussion.  
 To show the need for the notion of "the practice of participation", I began by 
considering the requirement that in order for nonpayment for benefits to be unfair, 
they must be worth their cost. Why should this be required? Because the refusal to 
pay, if such a requirement is not met, displays no preferential attitude towards my 
own interests. Either I am being treated worse than others, or everyone would be 
better off without the scheme's costs and benefits: in neither case does the refusal to 
cooperate display an arrogation of privileges to myself. I then observed that there is a 
sense in which a luxurious benefit compulsorily supplied to a poor person might be 
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worth its cost, but that this sense appeared irrelevant. And a simple explanation can 
surely be offered of why this sense is irrelevant in the same terms: if the poor person 
would be worse off getting the benefits and paying, but a rich person wouldn't, then 
the poor person's refusing to pay displays no preferential attitude towards his own 
interests. 
 This led me to distinguish a second sense in which the benefits conferred by a 
scheme may be worth their cost: I can be better off getting the benefits and paying 
than I am doing neither. But three refinements had to be made to this requirement. 
First, the benefits which are actually attributable to the scheme must be 
circumscribed, and merely fortuitous consequences of its operation, such as the 
discovery of treasure, ruled out. Secondly, we must take into account those costs 
which the scheme imposes and which are relevant to the justification of nonpayment, 
such as those imposed in making the fisherman's water unsafe. And thirdly, benefits 
attributable to the practice of nonparticipation in the scheme must be excluded from 
consideration.  
 In each case, the refinement I proposed is supported by my simple characterization 
of the kind of unfairness exhibited by the free rider: her objectionably preferential 
treatment of herself, in allowing herself not to pay for goods which she either does or 
ought to realize are worth paying for, and which she only receives because others are 
moved by the same realization to pay. The relevant benefits must be those at which 
participants in the scheme are aiming, since where this is not the case (as with the 
treasure), the beneficiary is not dependent on others' willingness to pay for them. The 
same point obviously explains the exclusion of benefits attributable to the practice of 
nonpayment - indeed, here, a beneficiary is not merely not dependent on compliance 
with the scheme's requirements for these benefits; she is dependent on 
noncompliance. Why should we identify the relevant costs with those for which the 
participants are collectively morally answerable - for which participants in the scheme 
are required to offer either a morally good reason or compensation? Approach the 
question this way. Suppose I am accused of free riding on a scheme, and adduce 
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certain costs which result from its operation, and which outweigh its benefits to me, 
in my defence. For which sorts of costs will that defence meet the accusation? On the 
proposed characterization of the free rider's unfairness, the accusation is that I give 
myself objectionably preferential treatment. Now suppose the costs I cite are ones for 
the imposition of which I can require participants in the scheme to produce a 
justification. If I can require this, what they offer as that justification must be that the 
costs are unavoidable if the scheme's benefits are to be produced. And if so, then 
when those costs outweigh the benefits, my requirement has not been met: as before, I 
am either being treated worse than others, or everyone would be better off without the 
scheme; either way, the accusation of objectionably preferential treatment fails. But if 
the costs I cite are not associated with such a requirement, then I am simply not 
speaking to the accusation. I have been challenged to justify my failure to pay for 
certain benefits, and have responded by citing a separate set of costs. The accusation 
of objectionably preferential treatment stands unaddressed. So given the proposed 
characterization of the free rider's unfairness, the costs that are relevant to the 
justification of nonpayment are those associated with this requirement. 
 Beyond this, my Principle of Fairness adds two further conditions. It is to be the 
case neither that the fair generalization of the scheme's requirements, in the manner 
discussed earlier, is to the detriment of practically everyone; nor that I am raising a 
legitimate moral objection to the scheme. How do these conditions contribute to the 
case for regarding nonparticipation as unfair? They do so for reasons of the same 
general form. The inclusion of the first is justified if the fact that the fair 
generalization of the scheme would be detrimental to practically everyone suffices 
(even if I'm actually receiving a net benefit) to make it fair for me to refuse to comply. 
-That is, if I can fairly refuse to comply whenever our all regarding as obligatory all 
requirements of a certain sort - those which must in fairness be so regarded if the 
scheme's requirements are themselves regarded as obligatory - would be detrimental 
to practically everyone. Why should we think so? Because if practically everyone will 
be better off if we all ignore demands of this sort, then my doing so involves no 
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arrogation of preferential advantages. I'm not objectionably favouring myself if I'm 
only performing an action of a sort which it's to the advantage of practically everyone 
for us all to perform. Why should the relevant sort be picked out in this particular way 
(by reference to what fairness requires us to regard as comparable)? Because if I tried 
to argue this on the basis of some other, self-favouring standard of generalization, 
then I would be arrogating such advantages. And why adopt the specific reading of 
"practically everyone" given earlier (as meaning either everyone, or enough others to 
make it unreasonable for the minority to resist the majority-beneficial outcome)? 
Because if a minority who would be worse off under the fair generalization of a 
scheme can fairly resist the majority-beneficial outcome, then there is unfairness in 
my endorsing this course of conduct for everyone.  
 Finally, the connection with considerations of preferential treatment also supports 
the inclusion of condition (iii), concerning the raising of legitimate moral objections. 
If there are such objections, then I should not be preferentially favouring myself in 
refusing to support it on such grounds, since everyone else ought to be doing the 
same. 
 Thus all the clauses of the Principle of Fairness I am proposing can be seen to 
flow naturally from a simple characterization of the kind of unfairness displayed by 
the Fare-Evader. The question with which my discussion began - "If the free rider 
harms no one, what is it about her conduct that makes it unfair?" - has now been fully 
answered, and both of the initial tasks completed. The features of her conduct which 
make it unfair are those identified by my principle; and those features make it unfair 
by convicting her of the sort of objectionably preferential treatment often 
characteristic of unfairness. 
 
V:  PRINCIPLES AND JUSTIFICATION 
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 I close with some remarks on two subjects: the justification which has just been 
offered for my principle, and the principle's own justificational ambitions. 
 The argument of the preceding section should not be misconstrued as a 
foundational one. It seeks to support the various clauses of the principle by invoking a 
general characterization of the Fare-Evader's unfairness in terms of the "arrogation of 
preferential advantages". But there is obviously no question of using a phrase this 
imprecise to deduce anything about the exact circumstances under which a person's 
conduct is unfair. Giving a precise interpretation to the phrase is hardly something 
which can be done in advance of thinking about particular cases of unfairness - and 
arriving at the sorts of intuitive judgements which are themselves summarized by the 
principle. The claim of the previous section is that the formulation of the principle is 
guided by a coherent and recognizable conception of fairness - a conception which the 
principle itself helps to clarify. 
 Finally, let me say something about the status of this principle. Had it purported to 
supply a set of "descriptive" conditions upon which unfairness supervenes, my 
proposal would have been hopelessly inadequate. After all, its second condition itself 
makes reference to fairness, and the third to moral legitimacy more generally. What 
has been presented might therefore be thought question-begging, or at least unhelpful. 
However, the intention has not been to produce a description which would furnish 
someone antecedently incapable of moral discriminations with an understanding of 
what the free rider's unfairness consists in. My aim has only been to state what people 
concerned about fairness are reacting to, in characterizing free riding as unfair. There 
are different species of unfairness: my account of one of them mentions others. If 
there is a correct reductive account of those further species of unfairness - and the 
remarks concerning "objectionably preferential treatment" surely do not supply it - it 
may simply be inserted into my principle. 
 Nor, moreover, need any dubious justificational ambitions be embodied in my 
advocacy of this principle. It should not be thought that I have committed myself to a 
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picture of the justification of moral commitments or moral judgements as the 
deduction of particular judgements from universal principles of this kind. An 
alternative is to say that the justification of anyone concerned to avoid free riding, in 
an uncomplicated case, need only be that he benefits from a scheme which produces 
benefits by making requirements of beneficiaries. There are of course many 
considerations which could countervail against this one, relating to circumstances in 
which nonpayment would be fair: the principle summarizes them. Indeed, I would 
prefer this latter way of conceiving of the justification of moral judgements, 
commitments and action. But defending it is another matter:
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 the point here is only 
that preserving the interest of the principle is compatible with an uncommitted stance 
on the structure of ethical justification. It claims to summarize the conditions under 
which one is justified in thinking that nonpayment is unfair, but need not itself 
constitute the justification. 
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NOTES 
 
For helpful comments on this paper, I am grateful to audiences at the Universities of 
Edinburgh and Glasgow, John Skorupski, Christopher Bryant, and an anonymous 
reader for Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
 
1  One sometimes encounters broader definitions, such as that of Rutherford (1992), 
p.181: "An individual who does not pay for the goods or services he/she consumes." 
However, it is difficult to see what interest is served by adopting a definition as broad 
as this, which is satisfied by the recipient of a gift. (A similar formulation in Gauthier 
(1986), p.96 is called a "definition" by his index.) 
2  The locus classicus of the contemporary economic public goods literature is 
Samuelson (1954). (For antecedents, see Head [1962], pp.197-98.) He emphasizes the 
third feature and infers from it the seventh; but the inference is dubious if those to 
whom a good with the third feature is available can have different capacities for 
consuming it. If the seventh feature is made definitive of publicity, however - as 
Samuelson (1955) suggests - the third can be inferred from it. Head (1962), pp.198-
206, Brennan (1993), pp.144-45 and Cullis and Jones (1992), pp.60-63 follow this 
pattern - although their claim that the seventh feature also entails the second is 
questionable. Ledyard (1987), p.739 and Pearce (1981), p.352 make the third feature 
definitive of publicity; Raz (1986), pp.198-9, the second; Becker (1982), p.217, the 
first; Rutherford (1992), p.375, the first three; Miller and Sartorius (1979), p.151, the 
first two; Schmidtz (1991), p.55 and Cowen (1992), p.3, the second and third; and 
Aaronson and Ott (1991), p.529, the second, third and sixth. Other writers prefer to 
use these features to define pure publicity, and make publicity a matter of the degree 
to which this is approximated. For Buchanan (1968), p.49, the second feature is 
definitive of pure publicity; for Bator (1958), p.369, the third; for Brown and Jackson 
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(1990), p.34, the seventh; for Pearce (1981), p.352, the second and third; and for 
Arneson (1982), pp.618-19, the second, third and sixth. 
3  For this label, see Miller and Sartorius (1979), p.151 and Hampton (1987), p.247. 
Schmidtz (1991), p.55 calls this feature "nonexclusiveness", and Klosko (1987), 
p.354 "nonexcludability". (Notice the difference between it and the following 
entailment of the seventh feature, which Head [1962], p.201 calls "jointness": "once 
produced, any given unit of the good can be made equally available to all.") 
4  For this label, see Miller and Sartorius (1979), p.151, Cowen (1992), p.3, and 
Arneson (1982), pp.618-19, who also calls goods with this feature "collective". 
Nonexcludability does not entail jointness in supply: consider deep-sea fish for those 
without boats. Furthermore, jointness in supply can be interpreted so as to include 
goods which could be restricted, but are in fact made freely available (such as a pile 
of free newspapers), in which case it does not entail nonexcludability either. But if (as 
seems the usual practice) the conditional is read more strongly - as requiring that it be 
of the nature of any good exhibiting jointness in supply that its availability to one 
entails its availability to all - then nonexcludability does follow.  
5  This label might more appropriately be applied to other features (the fifth, sixth or 
seventh). For its use in relation to this one, though, see Brennan (1993), p.145, who 
also calls this "nonrivalness", not distinguishing it from the fourth feature. Samuelson 
(1954), p.387 calls this "collective consumption"; Arneson (1982), p.618, de Jasay 
(1989), p.157 and Taylor (1987), p.7 simply "jointness."  
6  For this label, see Taylor (1987), p.7. It is more usually attached to the third feature, 
though: see e.g. Cowen (1992), p.4, Rutherford (1992), p.375 and Pearce (1981), 
p.352.  
7  My label for what Brown and Jackson (1990), p.35 call "non-rejectability", and  
Simmons (1979a, p.327) "openness".  
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8  My label for what Arneson (1982), pp.618-19 makes the third feature of "pure 
public goods", and Rawls (1971), p.266 calls "indivisibility".  
9  My label for what Samuelson (1955), p.350 calls "public consumption". 
10  This does not make the free rider problem a Prisoner's Dilemma (contra Hardin 
[1971]): it does not yet say that for each individual, cooperation is suboptimal, 
irrespective of the actions of other group members. For examples which satisfy the 
description in the text without being Prisoner's Dilemmas, see Frohlich et al. (1975), 
Hampton (1987) and Tuomela (1988). 
 If you think that rational action is action that optimizes the agent's interests, then 
replace "suboptimal from the point of view of self-interest" with "irrational". 
11  See Olson (1965), Frohlich et al. (1975), Tuck (1979), Pettit (1986) and Tuomela 
(1992). In calling this a game-theoretic interest, I'm not suggesting that the definition 
of free riding is something one will find in a textbook of game theory. 
12  See Ledyard (1987), Cowen (1992), Hershleifer (1983) and Isaac et al. (1985). The 
economist's problem ramifies into the work of political scientists such as Frohlich et 
al. (1970), (1971) and (1978), experimental sociologists such as Marwell and Ames 
(1979) and social psychologists such as Messick and Brewer (1983). 
13  Compare Pearce (1981), p.165. 
14  See Pasour (1981). As Miller and Sartorius (1975), p.152 point out, many of the 
commodities meeting standard definitions of public goods are positive evils. 
15  That's not to say that proponents of such conceptions must deny that free riding is 
wrong. Their most natural alternative attempts to account for its wrongness as a 
matter of theft, and to explain the difference between theft and the permissible taking 
of goods without appealing to fairness. 
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16
  Rawls (1971), pp.111-2. The debt to Hart's "principle of mutual restriction" is 
acknowledged when Rawls adds the remark:  
The main idea is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually 
advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their 
liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submitted 
to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those 
who have benefited from their submission. 
Compare Hart (1955), p.185; and for an important antecedent to Hart, see Broad 
(1916), pp.384-90. 
17  See Simmons (1979a) and (1979b), Arneson (1982), Klosko (1987 and 1992), 
Maphai (1987) and Davis (1987). It is rarely observed that providing such a 
foundation is not the intention in Rawls (1971), which abandons the advocacy in 
Rawls (1964) of a similar "Principle of Fair Play" for that end. The later claim is that 
the Principle of Fairness grounds all obligations, including most prominently the 
obligation of fidelity - i.e., promise-keeping - but that political duties have a different 
source. 
18  His stated principle, as opposed to the ostensible clarification expounding its "main 
idea", which appears to add the further conditions that the institution in question must 
be cooperative, and must be mutually advantageous. See note [16]. 
19  See Simmons (1979a), p.317. For further apparent counterexamples, see Arneson 
(1982), p.620. 
20  See Bell (1978), Arneson (1982), Morris (1983), Maphai (1987), Davis (1987) and 
Klosko (1987) and (1992). 
21  Compare Nozick (1974), p.95, for the nuisance who throws books into people's 
houses and then demands payment. In aiming his discussion against Rawls, Nozick 
assumes the inclusive reading of his principle. Simmons (1979a) defends Rawls 
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against the criticism by offering a stronger reading which stresses voluntary 
acceptance, with the gloss (p.327) that this involves one's "either (1) trying to get (and 
succeeding in getting) the benefit, or (2) taking the benefit willingly and knowingly." 
For a more detailed discussion, see Simmons (1979b), pp.42-5, 89-90, 138-63, 187-
99. See also Miller and Sartorius (1979), p.166. 
22  See Nozick (1974), pp.93-4, for the well-known example of the public address 
system. 
23  See p.94. 
24  See pp.94-5. 
25  The lighthouse example of Gauthier (1986), p.96 is an analogue of this one. 
26  If he were catching more fish thanks to their self-restraint, then it could be 
maintained that in choosing not to throw back the surplus, he would be accepting the 
benefits conferred upon him. 
27  This line of thought seems implicit in Nozick (1974), and is explicit in Simmons 
(1979a). Simmons is prepared to accept that "ordinary feelings about fair play" do 
endorse an accusation of unfairness in this sort of case (in his example, a resident 
enjoys the benefits of a cooperative scheme for beautifying the neighbourhood, while 
refusing to join in - pp.330-1), but maintains that "those feelings are mistaken" 
(p.332). However, it is only by reference to such "ordinary feelings" that his own 
Principle of Fairness has been supported. If, therefore, a more discriminating version 
of the principle can be provided, accommodating the Nozickian judgements with 
which Simmons begins, while also endorsing the accusation of unfairness in this sort 
of case, then Simmons's methodology would appear to compel him to accept it. 
28  See Arneson (1982), pp.617-20 - also Klosko (1987), p.353-55 and Maphai (1987), 
pp.77-78. 
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29  Arneson (1982), p.622 spells this condition out more fully: "It is unfeasible that the 
the cooperative scheme be arranged so that private benefits are supplied to each 
beneficiary of B in sufficient quantity to induce all beneficiaries to contribute their 
fair share of the costs of the scheme." The rationale of this condition "is simply that, if 
one can secure the needed public good in a fair manner and without coercion, one 
should not resort to coercion." 
30  It might be held that although the benefits conferred by other public transport 
schemes are excludable, those conferred by this one, with its honesty system, must be 
nonexcludable. However, this move, which would make excludability more properly 
a characteristic of benefit-conferring schemes than of the benefits themselves, has the 
more serious consequence that goods of any type conferred by a scheme an essential 
characteristic of which is its forcing them upon people will count as nonexcludable. 
This would mean endorsing the demands of a cooperatively organized version of the 
Enterprising Elves's scheme. 
 Anyway, this manoeuvre does not address the theatre sneak case, which equally 
exemplifies the sort of free riding of which I am seeking an account. 
31  There is surely no threat to such an opponent in either the observation that the 
judgements Nozick actually makes are compatible with recognizing obligations to pay 
for nonvoluntary benefits in other circumstances (compare Maphai [1987], p.74); the 
strategy of asserting the evident nature of political obligations and claiming a version 
of the Principle of Fairness as their best explanation (Klosko [1987], p.355); or the 
interesting argument that Nozick's Lockean account of the legitimacy of the 
appropriation of private property in a state of nature relies upon foundations which 
equally support an extended Principle of Fairness (Arneson [1982], pp.623-33 - 
compare Davis [1987]).  
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32  The deliberately vague term "scheme" is used here to range over any actual or 
potential practice which confers benefits by making requirements of beneficiaries. 
33  I help myself here to a loose usage of "obligatory", according to which to regard a 
requirement as obligatory is simply to regard it as a requirement which it would be 
morally wrong not to comply with. For a more discriminating usage, see e.g. Lemmon 
(1962), p.141, and Rawls (1971), p.113. 
34  According to Nozickians, if an outcome is produced in circumstances where 
payment is required for non-voluntary benefits, then any minority may reasonably 
resist it. But that shouldn't persuade you that they can agree with my principle. Their 
claim is that it is not unreasonable, under such circumstances, for a minority to resist; 
so they are not claiming that practically everyone (in the stipulated sense) is worse 
off. If so, the principle does produce anti-Nozickian judgements concerning the 
unfairness of nonpayment for nonvoluntary benefits, even if we allow the Nozickians' 
own claims concerning reasonableness to govern the interpretation of "practically 
everyone".  
35  For formulations which include a cooperation condition, see Hart (1955), p.185, 
Rawls (1971), p.112, Simmons (1979a), p.317 and Morris (1983), p.18. For both 
cooperation and nonexcludability conditions, see Arneson (1982), p.623, Klosko 
(1987), pp.353-5 and Maphai (1987), p.78. 
36  As would be the case if they had simply congregated in a neighbourhood of St. 
Andrews and begun trying to impose their commercial practice upon others. 
37  I needn't try to say here in virtue of what one agent is to be held morally answerable 
for imposing a cost on another. My claim requires only that our difficulties in 
deciding what an agent is morally answerable for are themselves difficulties 
concerning the attribution of costs to people's participation in a benefit-conferring 
scheme. 
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38  Of course, we're still at this point awaiting my argument against the Nozickian 
claim that a scheme's requiring someone to pay for benefits it has forced upon him 
itself grounds a legitimate moral objection. 
39  The same strategy of argument will support obligations to pay for benefits which 
have been accepted from a scheme failing to satisfy condition (i) or (ii) - for instance, 
one whose costs outweigh its benefits. 
40  Notice that this goes beyond Arneson's sensible suggestion that we take the costs of 
coercion into account in assessing whether a scheme confers a net benefit (Arneson 
[1982], p.621): even so, its fair generalization may fail to be beneficial. 
41  In no straightforward sense is this true of a judge who becomes bored with the 
litigants before him and tosses a coin, for example. 
42  For a full account of the connection between intentions and plans towards which I 
am gesturing here, see Bratman (1987). 
43  I am grateful to an anonymous reader for Philosophy and Public Affairs for this 
formulation of the point. 
44  This formulation of the argument should be acceptable even to moral 
"particularists" like Dancy (1993), for whom the fact that a certain feature of a 
situation is a reason for its unfairness does not entail that that feature is a reason for 
the unfairness of any other situation in which it is present. 
45  Consider the features of inflicting pain, and doing something because of the 
enjoyment one derives from it. The fallacy is identified in Kagan (1988). 
46  For a fuller account of this conception of moral justification, see Cullity (1994) and 
(forthcoming). 
